Constitutional Decisionmaking:
A Signature Chicago Law Experience
By Meredith Heagney

I

n many ways, Professor Geoffrey Stone’s Constitutional
Decisionmaking class is a quintessential Chicago Law
experience: The class is extremely rigorous and
challenging. It is idea based and requires deep thinking
about complicated topics under serious deadlines—both
for the students and for Stone. It forces students to examine
and constantly reconsider their ideas and judgments, and
it encourages endless debate. The class is a true example
of teaching students how to think like lawyers.
Suffice it to say, it is a lot of work.
Here’s how Stone designed the class to work: 2L and 3L
students can apply for admission. Students apply with
classmates as a “court,” made up of a group of five “justices.”
Stone typically chooses three courts by lot, and each operates
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independently during the course of the seminar. Usually,
about half of the students who apply get a spot.
Every week, each court gets the same two hypothetical
cases that Stone created to focus on different aspects of a
constitutional issue. In recent years, it has been the Equal
Protection Clause, though in the past he has also focused
on freedom of speech and freedom of religion.
Each court must carefully consider each case and write its
opinions. A court producing just one opinion in a case is
very rare; it’s much more common for courts to turn in a
majority opinion, a concurring opinion, and a dissenting
opinion—and often multiple concurring or dissenting
opinions. All this is accomplished within a week, so when
the students receive the cases, they must read and analyze
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them, decide who will write the opinions, circulate drafts
and respond to one another’s opinions, and revise and edit
opinions very quickly.
Here’s the catch: the students cannot rely upon any real
judicial precedents to support their arguments. They
approach the first case as it’s the first case ever to interpret
the relevant constitutional provision and then create their
own body of law over time. Otherwise, Stone said, the
research would take all their time, instead of the thinking.
And that’s the part he most prizes.
Each court’s decisions build on one another, as the
justices must grapple with their own precedents. Students
are graded on every opinion they join, without regard to
who wrote it, and Stone expects each opinion to respond
to the other opinions in each case. By quarter’s end, each
court produces a full body of jurisprudence that Stone
binds for them in a book that is commonly 200–300
pages, single-spaced.
“The demands on the student are enormous,” Stone said,
but the rewards are obvious. The opinions get much better

over the course of the quarter, and Stone has to look ever
harder for inconsistencies and gaps in logic as the work
improves. But he always demands more of the students.
“It’s a really great teaching experience for me because I
can see how they are learning.”
Stone has offered the class most years since 1973, except
for the nine years he spent as University Provost, between
1993 and 2002. Consequently, it is remembered vividly
by generations of alumni. Those who took it remember
its rigor and rewards, and those who didn’t simply
remember its reputation. How Stone teaches the class is
a major part of that.
“I remember Geof being very inspiring,” said David
Bradford, ’76, a partner and cochair of the Litigation
Department at Jenner & Block in Chicago. He said the
class was, by far, his favorite during his time at the Law
School. “He had a great ability to get people to do their
own thinking and to challenge themselves. He challenged
people in a very positive way, and he got people to push
themselves and the limits of their own capabilities.”

A court meets in the library to discuss the week’s cases. By quarter’s end, Stone will give each member of each court a bound copy of their
opinions. (Examples at top left.)
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Stone puts it simply: “I want them to come away with a
much better understanding of how to think clearly and
how to write clearly … It trains them to be rigorous and
self-critical thinkers.”
That heavy-duty thinking was sometimes a midweek
challenge for the “justices,” said Alexis Bates, ’12, an
associate at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom. She
took the class last winter.
“All the cases were right on the line. There were no easy
cases,” she said. And sometimes, justices choose a side, and
then, “as you’re thinking through and writing out that
opinion, you end up talking yourself out of it and thinking it
should go the other way altogether.” At least one time, one
of her fellow justices changed opinions midweek, and the
dissent became the majority, she said.
Bradford said the class was great training for his clerkship
and later practice because it taught him how to be persuasive.
“It helped us all appreciate how difficult judging could be and
what type of advocacy or principles might be most appealing
to a judge who’s concerned about precedential effect and
the limits of their own roles as judges,” Bradford said.

As for the rigor, he has positive memories. “It was so
much fun,” he said. “It was the kind of hard work you
became so immersed in, and cared so much about, that
it never felt like work.”
Bradford was one of the first students to take the class,
the idea for which came to Stone when he joined the
faculty in 1973. Stone, a member of the class of 1971,
remembered critiquing many judicial opinions as a law
student. He often wondered why it seemed so difficult
for judges to write decent opinions.
He got his answer soon after graduation, when he clerked
for Judge J. Skelly Wright in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit and for Justice William J.
Brennan Jr. of the Supreme Court. Then, when he actually
had the chance to write drafts of opinions, he saw how
challenging it was, he said. One of the most difficult things
was making sure the opinion reflected both the viewpoint
of his judge and the other judges on the opinion; he had
to strike a balance between what his boss considered the
ideal argument and what the other judges would agree with.
“There are usually no definitively right answers to hard

Stone said the class is intended to enable students to “work together in a complicated and stressful situation,” because that’s what law
practice demands.
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separation in dormitories violates the Equal Protection
Clause. Before 1992, only 30 percent of justices agreed. In
the 20 years after, that number rose to 52 percent of justices.
“In the earlier era the idea of same-sex dorms was still
pretty foreign to them. They simply didn’t yet exist in
most colleges and universities,” Stone said. “By the time
of the later set of decisions, many of the students had
experienced same-sex dorms and didn’t see the idea of such
an arrangement as particularly untoward or problematic.”
The longevity of the course is part of what Stone finds so
satisfying. “I find it very rewarding from an educational
standpoint,” he said. “I can see, and students tell me, and
alumni tell me 25 years later, how valuable it was.”
Bradford, one of those early takers, didn’t know the class
was still offered. “I’m delighted to hear that,” he said.
“Generations have benefited from that class. I’d be surprised
if it wasn’t on a top-classes list for a lot of graduates of the
Law School.”

questions, and even if you do your best, there will be
arguments to make on the other side. It’s easy to poke
holes,” he said. “I wanted to give students that experience.”
More than anything, he said, the class is “a device for
enabling students to work together in a complicated and
stressful situation, which is what law practice is like.”
Stone’s students say his teaching style is to be always
available to talk about ideas, but to let the courts figure out
their own issues. “Especially in the early weeks, figuring out
what sort of court you are and how you’re going to approach
issues and different styles involves a lot of gnashing of
teeth,” said Josh Mahoney, ’13, who took the course last
year. “Professor Stone encourages that, that it should be
difficult, especially at the beginning.”
His court had a lot of “false starts,” Mahoney said, but
eventually found their way. “If you’re stuck, Professor
Stone gives you ways to think about an issue. Mostly he’s
a lighthouse, so to speak, but you and your group still
have to try not to crash the boat into the rocks.”
The class meets once at the beginning of the quarter, and
then everything is done outside of class: The courts figure
out when and how to meet within themselves, and they
communicate with Stone through emails and in face-to-face
appointments and office drop-ins. At the end of the quarter,
Stone has the students over to his house to talk about the
course. He also hands out statistics on how the present-day
courts voted on cases as opposed to students from decades
past. He changes one or two cases a year, but many have
been around for a long time.
The results are very interesting. For example, Edison v.
Eberhart asks whether the East Lansing, Michigan, school
board may limit participation in school board elections to
citizens with children attending or soon-to-be attending
the schools in the district. Between 1974 and 1992, 74
percent of judges found that unconstitutional. From 2003
to 2012, only 46 percent found it unconstitutional.
“I would guess this is because there was a significant
change in Equal Protection doctrine in the real Supreme
Court over time that downplayed fundamental rights
jurisprudence under the Equal Protection Clause,” Stone
said. “As a consequence, I think students, reflecting in part
what they learned in their courses, also became less certain
about the merits of that branch of the Equal Protection
doctrine. They were therefore more likely to uphold the
law in Edison than were students in the earlier generation.”
A change over time is also seen in Gold v. Georgia State
University, where a female student argues that gender
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CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING WITH GEOFFREY STONE
Equal Protection Hypothetical Cases
Comparative Results 1974-1992 and 2003-2012*
Percent of justices voting to hold law unconstitutional
Case

Issue

1974-1992

2003-2012

Possibly corrupt
economic
classification

73%

59%

Barker v. Boston

Simply
economic
classification

9%

8%

Dillworth v.
Damforth

Discrimination
against
AfricanAmericans

98%

99%

Inequality in
voting

74%

46%

Fellers v. Fellers

Discrimination
against women

87%

93%

Gold v. Georgia
State University

Sex-segregated
dorms in public
university

30%

52%

Holloway v.
Harmon

Welfare/right
to travel

52%

32%

Kent v. Kansas
State University

Affirmative
action in public
university

47%

50%

Alexander v.
Alabama

Edison v.
Eberhart

*note: Between 1992 and 2003, Geof Stone was University Provost and did not teach the class

■

T H E

U N I V E R S I T Y

O F

C H I C A G O

L A W

S C H O O L

21

